Military liaisons between Nato and the Warsaw Pact

An Agenda for the Future

by John A. Fahey and Philip S. Gillette
Johns Hopkins University Foreign Policy Institute
Dec 8, 1988
USMLM Association ed.  The ensuing paper provides an interesting perspective from the past on the future of military-politico liaisons while at the same time reflecting on the experiences of the US Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany during the Cold War.  Reprinted by the USMLM Association with permission from the Johns Hopkins University Foreign Policy Institute

With U.S.-Soviet relations likely to remain predominantly competitive, not cooperative, for the foreseeable future, the two superpowers will undoubtedly continue to maintain at high readiness their powerful military establishments and opposing military alliances. At the same time, a common perception that any direct military hostilities would be extremely costly and threaten nuclear escalation may well lead Washington and Moscow to seek additional means of decreasing the likelihood of an accidental conflict or of avoiding the escalation of a conventional war into a nuclear war.

Consequently, the United States and the Soviet Union can be expected to multiply and deepen their efforts to reduce armaments, to improve crisis management (epitomized by the hot line and the new Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers), and bolster crisis-prevention and confidence-building measures (such as the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and the 1986 Stockholm agreement on confidence- and security-building measures [CSBMs] in Europe).

In crafting such agreements, U.S. and Soviet leaders clearly need access to the best military and strategic intelligence available. Because of what has been termed the "reconnaissance revolution," Washington and Moscow know more and more about each other's military capabilities.1 Yet they have less confidence in their understanding of each other's military intentions. Therefore, both superpowers have a strong interest in involving their militaries in efforts to learn more about each other's attitudes, habits of thinking, and military doctrines.2 In fact, the scope of the bilateral U.S.-Soviet military dialogue expanded dramatically in 1987 and 1988 with an unprecedented series of high-level visits, an agreement for further exchanges in 1988 and 1990, and the establishment of a joint working group to explore the issue of dangerous military activity.

In light of the progress towards CSBMs in Europe and the quickening of the U.S.Soviet military dialogue, the time is ripe for the United States to explore ways of expanding the NATO-Warsaw Pact military dialogue. One way for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to enhance this dialogue is to exchange military liaison missions (MLMs) linldng the two alliances. NATO's MLM would be located at or near the headquarters of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow; the Warsaw Pact's MLM would be situated at or near NATO's European military headquarters in Moms, Belgium. These MLMs would aim to promote common interests and mutual understanding, and to provide continuous and direct on-site liaison and communications at the highest operational military level in Europe. This step is likely to be supported by America's NATO allies and has a good chance of winning Warsaw Pact approval.

The Present Military Dialogue in Europe

The existing links between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe are sparse, and this is especially true of purely military linkages. The most prominent communications between the two alliances are the official communiques they routinely issue. Since 1973 the two alliances have been engaged in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. Yet France, whose forces are not formally integrated into the NATO command structure, does not participate, and, in any event, the exercise has not been particularly productive.

The Helsinki Process includes review conferences scheduled every three years, as well as two specialized forums on security issues -- The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and the Conventional Stability Talks (CST), a new conventional arms reduction negotiation likely to begin sometime in 1989. One advantage of the Helsinki forums is that they include all twentythree members of the two alliances; one disadvantage is that they also include twelve other states. h addition, the MBFR and Helsinki forums are directed by political and diplomatic personnel, not military officers. Military dialogues between the alliances are virtually nonexistent.

In contrast, military liaison has been established and dialogues have taken place between U.S. and Soviet commanders in Germany for more than forty years. Both militaries have scrupulously honored the provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement of April 5, 1947, which established MLMs accredited to the Soviet and American Commanders-in-Chief of Zones of Occupation in Germany.3 At present the U.S. MLM is located near Potsdam, East Germany, and is accredited to the Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. The corresponding Soviet MLM is located in Frankfurt, West Germany, and is accredited to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe. The Huebner-Malinin Agreement has facilitated military meetings and negotiations, even during the days of high East-West tensions immediately before and after the construction of the Berlin Wall.

Similarly, the British and French have maintained military liaison missions and conducted negotiations under parallel agreements signed by the British and French commanders and Soviet Colonel General M. S. Malinin on September 16, 1946, and April 3, 1947, respectively. Under the provisions of the three agreements, 126 U.S., British, French, and Soviet military personnel are able to travel virtually unimpeded throughout West and East Germany.

The U.S. and Soviet militaries have also discussed European security issues in their rapidly expanding bilateral dialogue, and the United States regularly briefs its NATO allies on these contacts. But the peculiar result is that what is possibly the single most significant military dialogue on Europe today is being carried on in a non-European setting.

Building on Huebner-Malinin

The establishment of military liaison missions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would advance the existing bilateral and multilateral East-West dialogues on security in Europe one step further. The apparent success of the U.S.-Soviet MLMs operating under the Huebner-Malinin Agreement indicates that bloc-to-bloc MLMs would also be worthwhile.

All the same, the Huebner-Malinin MLMs and the proposed NATO-Warsaw Pact missions would differ sharply in their objectives. The bloc-to-bloc missions would be strictly limited to the liaison needed to promote a better understanding and cooperation rather than intelligence and confrontation between the opposing forces and to serve as on-site instruments for a myriad of lines of communication.

This difference in objectives would show up prominently in the foreign-language qualifications required for the current U.S. Military Liaison Mission personnel and those that would be needed for the proposed NATO mission. To date, the language skills of many U.S. personnel have been deficient. Between 1960 and 1962, for example, most U.S. mission members spoke, read, or understood Russian too poorly to perform many liaison duties. The Chief of Mission spoke neither Russian nor German. The senior air force officer, a lieutenant colonel, who replaced a competent Russian linguist, had no proficiency in any foreign language. Another air force officer, a major, spoke Arabic but neither Russian nor German. Navy Commander John A. Fahey, a competent Russian linguist, relieved a lieutenant commander who served two separate mission tours, a total of seven years, without knowing Russian. No assigned enlisted personnel knew Russian, either.

Repeating this situation would be disastrous for the proposed NATO mission. Each staff member should be proficient in speaking, understanding, reading, and writing at least one of the national languages of the members of the Warsaw Pact.

Placing the Missions

Since the proposed exchange of military missions is supposed to improve liaison between the two alliances at the highest operational military level in Europe, the Warsaw Pact's military liaison mission should be set up in or near Mons, Belgium, where NATO's European military headquarters are located. But the Pact's MLM would occupy its own building, which would be kept some distance from the NATO command center. Moms is also near NATO's political headquarters in Brussels. The Warsaw Pact's MLM mission would therefore be accredited to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)-currently U.S. Army General John R. Galvin. SACEUR would also be responsible for and receive reports from NATO's MLM to the Warsaw Pact.

By the same token, NATO's MLM would be located in or near Moscow, home of the staff headquarters of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. There can be no doubt that this complex is the Pact's highest operational military command. NATO's military liaison mission would be accredited to the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact -- currently Marshal V. G. Kulikov. This officer would also be responsible for and receive reports from the Pact's MLM in Belgium.

But because the two alliances are structured differently, alternative, lower-level locations for the proposed MLMs suggest themselves. The Pact's MLM, for example, might be accredited to NATO's Central European Command (AFCENT), headquartered at Brunssum, the Netherlands. Its NATO counterpart could be accredited to the Warsaw Pact's High Command of Forces in the Western Theater of Military Operations. But this lower-level exchange would carry some disadvantages, too -- for example, it would exclude each alliance's northern and southern flanks from the MLMs' purview.

Conversely, an argument can be made for assigning the Warsaw Pact MLM to even higher NATO authority than SACEUR in Moms -- namely the Military Committee located in Brussels. Arguably NATO's Military Committee, as the Alliance's "highest military authority," is the true counterpart of the Warsaw Pact's headquarters.4 Yet in many ways, NATO's European Command and SACEUR appear to overshadow the Military Committee, and a Warsaw Pact MLM in Brussels may not be able to function at peak effectiveness.

The Functions and Organization of the Missions

Both new pact-to-pact MLMs would have a wide range of responsibilities. Each would conduct monthly reviews of the other alliance's military proposals or initiatives relating to European security.

Each would review their host alliance's press coverage of NATO-Warsaw Pact issues and hold monthly meetings with the host's military representatives to discuss misconceptions and polemics in order to clear the air and create a better understanding of military postures and purposes. In addition, quarterly meetings of representatives of both missions would be held to discuss mutually agreed-on agenda items. And each mission should report to its parent organization the results of its analyses and exchanges with the other alliance, as well as brief officials of the parent organizations whenever they visit mission sites.

The staffs could also perform various important middleman duties. They should, for example, remain available as on-site instruments capable, if called on, of handling problems or incidents that may arise between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. They should maintain libraries of appropriate unclassified films, books, journals, and newspapers for their host organization's use, and provide interpreter teams for NATOWarsaw Pact meetings, military exchanges, one-way visits, and courtesy calls. They should attend host organization military and social functions on an invitational basis and celebrate national holidays together.

And each MLM staff should establish an internal language-training and cultural education program. The main purpose of this program would be to provide advanced instruction for mission personnel already highly proficient in a foreign language; secondarily, the program would teach staff members additional foreign languages.

The organizational details of the proposed NATO-Warsaw Pact MLMs would have to be hammered out by negotiations between the two sides. Common sense and forty years of experience with the Huebner-Malinin Agreement provide ground rules for some necessary provisions in the written agreement.

These missions must be strictly military missions and should have no authority over other missions (for example, political or diplomatic missions) of each respective organization. They are to be constituted solely for the purpose of liaison between the military chiefs and staffs.

Each MLM could be composed of up to twenty-five officers and enlisted personnel chosen by their own organization. MLM staffs would contain no political representatives. Tours of duty would be limited to a maximum of three years. And each alliance separately would determine the individuals chosen for staff positions as well as the states to be represented.

Each staff member of each mission would be accorded diplomatic immunity by the state of the opposite organization. Each member of the missions would also be given identical travel rights, including identical permanent passes permitting complete freedom of travel throughout the territory in Europe occupied by all the members of the opposite alliance. Requests to visit military facilities under NATO or Warsaw Pact control would be honored on a reciprocal basis. But mission members would not visit military facilities or dispositions of military units without escort or supervision by the host military command.

Each mission would have communication facilities permitting direct contact with its own headquarters. Couriers and messengers would be provided with means of travel under diplomatic immunity. Such facilities would also be available to mission personnel travelling within the NATO or Warsaw Pact countries. Host-alliance headquarters would provide MLMs with lodgings, food, fuel, and office furniture. And the buildings and vehicles of each mission would enjoy full right of extraterritoriality.

Dealing with Incidents

The MLM proposal aims at creating a direct and permanent means of communication between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. Such continuous communication channels, however, may also be well suited to handling dangerous incidents arising between the two alliances. Their potential for crisis management can be illustrated by recalling a violation of East German airspace by an American military aircraft in 1960. In this case, the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in East Germany helped avert a major East-West blowup.

The violation of East German airspace by a U.S. Air Force C-47 took place on May 20, 1960 -- the same month during which the Soviets downed an American U-2 spy plane overflying their territory and a private French sports plane invaded East German airspace. The French violation of May 5 drew a strong protest from Colonel General Ivan I. Yakubovsky, commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany -- the host organization for the U.S. MLM:

I want to draw your attention to the fact that Soviet troops in East Germany, in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty could have taken measures against the aircraft preventing it from flying over East Germany with immunity . . .

The Soviet command in the future will be forced to the most strongest measures for curbing any future violations of the airspace of East Germany.5

Yet only fifteen days later, en route from Denmark to its home base in Libya, the C-47 violated East German airspace and was forced down by Soviet fighters in the northern part of the country. The five crew members and four passengers were detained.
General Clyde D. Eddleman, commander of the United States Army in Europe, contacted Yakubovsky requesting the "immediate return" of the Americans.6 Army Lieutenant Colonel Clarke T. Baldwin and Air Force Major Matthew Warren of the U.S. MLM staff were dispatched to the scene to evaluate the situation and to arrange with the Soviets the release of the passengers by bus through West Berlin.

But negotiations with the Soviets resulted in an even simpler solution. Since Warren was a qualified C-47 pilot, the Soviets, with U.S. Air Force approval, permitted Warren to fly the downed aircraft and all the captives out of East Germany. On May 25, the day of the plane's departure, Baldwin and Warren, the original C-47 pilot, and two Soviet colonels signed a protocol; the plane, crew, and passengers were promptly released and flew directly to Weisbaden, West Germany. In view of Yakubovsky's earlier protest and severe warning, it is doubtful that the violation could have been handled so expeditiously had an on-site U.S. mission not been accredited to his command.

In view of this and other successes, it is clear that MLMs linking the two alliances could handle a variety of potentially worrisome incidents that would fall outside today's East-West military channels of communication. In particular, the proposed missions could be responsible for defusing incidents involving the armed forces of states presently not participating in Huebner-Malinin-type MLMs (for instance, West Germany), or in handling problems that occur outside the geographical area covered by these agreements (Czechoslovakia, for example).

MLMs and Alliance Politics

The concept of alliance-to-alliance MLMs should have great appeal for the U.S. government. After all, Washington has embraced the idea of U.S.-Soviet bilateral military dialogues in order to strengthen crisis stability, and has sought to normalize and institutionalize such exchanges.

Moreover, NATO has discussed proposals to establish a consultative commission on CSBM compliance.7 In the Stockholm negotiations the United States opposed the idea, arguing that it could disrupt NATO decisionmaking.8 Yet the proposed MLMs would not present this problem. They would be instruments not of the Helsinki Process, but of the two alliances themselves. Further, unlike a CSBM consultative commission, the MLMs would have no arms-control verification or compliance functions. The proposed exchange of missions also accords with NATO's twin-track approach toward the Warsaw Pact--defense and dialogue. Although the proposed missions may be weighted toward dialogue, they can serve a military purpose by increasing NATO's understanding of its adversary's military intentions.

Still, different NATO allies can be expected to respond to the proposed U.S. initiative in different ways. Britain and France, for example -- which already exchange MLMs with Soviet forces in Central Europe -- could be less enthusiastic about multilateral missions than some NATO countries without any MLMs.

Nevertheless, NATO members as a whole would see compelling reasons to back a U.S. initiative for multilateral missions. In the first place, such a proposal would constitute a constructive Western initiative toward the Soviet bloc at a time when Mikhail Gorbachev is bombarding the West with all kinds of ambitious and inviting ideas. Moreover, most NATO countries would probably prefer to cooperate in a single Alliance-wide military liaison arrangement with the Warsaw Pact rather than encourage the proliferation of bilateral military dialogues and/or missions between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In addition, several signs indicate that the Soviet Union would react favorably to an initiative such as the multilateral MLM proposal. At the 26th Soviet Communist Party Congress in 1986, Gorbachev declared that international security can no longer be seen as a zero-sum game and that international security is best enhanced by political rather than military means. And in June 1988 Gorbachev told the 19th Soviet Communist Party Conference that under perestroika (restructuring) the Soviet military should emphasize cooperation rather than confrontation.

Perhaps most strikingly, the Soviet military press is talking up cooperative security approaches as well. On June 12, 1988, following the Moscow summit, a Krasnaya Zvezda editorial concluded:

The influence of the realities of the contemporary world and the possible modifications of a number of objective factors giving rise to wars, permit one to think that the guarantee of governments' security all the more will be shifted from spheres of alignment of war potentials to spheres of politics, primacy of law, moral behavior common to all mankind, and fulfillment of international responsibility.

The recently expanded superpower military dialogue has also been featured in the Soviet military press. Indeed, during the Moscow summit, in its June 3 issue, Krasnaya Zvezda interviewed U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci at the Central Museum of the USSR Armed Forces in Moscow. The paper reported that Carlucci was accompanied by a galaxy of top Soviet and U.S. defense officials and commanders. Concerning his talks with Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, Krasnaya Zvezda quoted Secretary Carlucci as stating:

We talked about creating military contacts and about avoiding dangerous incidents. I think that we are building bridges of understanding and bridges of trust. This process must continue. Our first meeting was successful. The second was just as successful in developing mutual understanding.

In fact, Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders have advanced their own proposals for greater contact between NATO and the Pact. During his visit to Paris in October 1985 Gorbachev recommended starting an organized dialogue of some kind between the two alliances. h May 1987 the Warsaw Pact governments proposed to NATO that the two sides hold consultations at an authoritative expert level "with the participation of military specialists of countries of both sides" for the purpose of comparing their respective military doctrines. More recently, Krasnaya Zvezda's July 12, 1988, issue reported that Gorbachev had added improved communications between NATO and the Warsaw Pact to his long list of diplomatic initiatives. Speaking in Poland, the General Secretary advocated the establishment of a permanent center in Europe to further cooperation between the two alliances.

If the Soviet Union favors a NATO-Warsaw Pact exchange of missions, the other Pact members would probably fall in line. In fact, they would probably genuinely favor such a venture. After all, certain Warsaw Pact members, such as Czechoslovakia, have been especially active in pushing schemes for arms limitations and reductions in Europe.

Pitfalls and Problems

Several tough questions can be asked about the feasibility and even the desirability of exchanging MLMs with the Warsaw Pact. Does the proposal play into the hands of Soviet military strategists? No one can deny that the establishment of MLMs might lull Western publics and governments into a false sense of security and lead them to lower their guard. Worse, the Pact could use the MLMs to emphasize differences within NATO in order to split the Alliance.

Yet, the West need not passively succumb to Pact tactics. Surely, NATO has the means to prevent these inter-alliance contacts from creating a misleading impression of Pact activities and intentions. Moreover, since the MLMs would engage in dialogues, not negotiations, the Warsaw Pact will have few opportunities to exacerbate NATO's internal divisions.

Some may also object that this MLM proposal flows from too rosy a view of the Huebner-Maliin Agreement. The fatal shooting of Major Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr., a member of the U.S. MLM, by a Soviet soldier in March 1985 was a sharp reminder that the U.S.-Soviet bilateral military exchanges have not always proceeded smoothly. And even though the U.S. mission in East Germany performed important liaison functions during the early 1960s, grave incidents marred the operation of the U.S. mission at Potsdam during this period, including four shootings.

Yet the Soviet Union has now apologized for the shooting of Major Nicholson. In fact, the United States and the USSR have been able peacefully to resolve most of the problems arising from the operations of their missions in East and West Germany. Surely, NATO and the Warsaw Pact can achieve similar success.

An undeniable danger also exists that the Warsaw Pact will use its mission for espionage. With wider opportunities to travel throughout Western Europe and greater access to NATO personnel and facilities, a Warsaw Pact MLM would surely enhance the Soviet bloc's intelligence collection capabilities. With a reasonable degree of vigilance, however, NATO should be able to confine such spying to acceptable limits. Moreover, NATO's MLM would acquire the same capabilities vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. And if either alliance decided that some restrictions were needed on MLM travel, these could be negotiated on a reciprocal basis.

The intra-NATO cooperation necessary to initiate and sustain the MLM proposal over the long run will be difficult to attain. It will certainly surpass, for example, the level of interagency cooperation that has been required in Washington to support the bilateral exchanges under the Huebner-Malinin pact. Yet NATO's extensive experience with integrated military staffs suggests that the requisite cooperation is achievable. And the proposed inter-alliance missions will eschew responsibilities in such potentially divisive areas as arms control.

Nonparticipation by some NATO countries may create certain problems. Even though it would hardly be necessary for each NATO member to assigu personnel to the mission at Moscow, if some West European countries refuse to permit Warsaw Pact mission personnel to travel throughout their territory, restrictions by Soviet bloc countries would have to be expected. And if too much territory on either side were declared off-limits for these reasons, the alliances might conclude that the proposed exchange would not be worthwhile.

Some Western voices will no doubt charge that the MLM plan would legitimize the Warsaw Pact, an organization used by the Soviet Union to dominate Eastern Europe. Yet the sixteen NATO and seventeen Warsaw Pact countries have already engaged in informal talks at Geneva on the detailed mandate for the Conventional Stability Talks. Besides, a limited-purpose agreement concerning liaison missions need not imply any condoning of other Warsaw Pact behavior or policies.

h addition, some concern might be expressed that the NATO MLM would duplicate the work of NATO military attaches in Moscow. Actually the NATO MLM will significantly augment the information and services presently provided by the attaches. Moreover, the attaches will be dealing with the Soviet Ministry of Defense; the NATO mission will be dealing with the headquarters of the Warsaw Pact Forces.

A final possible barrier or impediment to U.S. participation might be Washington's own fault. The U.S. government may not have enough qualified personnel to carry out the mission. Five or six qualified Russian-language specialists would be needed to help staff the MLM in Moscow. Moreover, the Pentagon would need to do much more to make such an assignment a smart career move for ambitious officers.

The expanded observation of Warsaw Pact military maneuvers in Europe under the Stockholm Agreement and the beginning of on-site inspections to verify implementation of the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) treaty has already taxed the U.S. military's supply of Russian linguists to the limit. Additional East-West arms-control agreements involving on-site verification will create an even more acute shortage. The U.S. military would have to expand its Russian-language training programs in order to meet such responsibilities and participate successfully in the MLM plan. The MLM assignment might attract better personnel if tours of duty were set at three years. This measure would satisfy the present promotion requirement for three years' service in a joint command.

Overall, the potential gains from the exchange of MLMs outweigh the possible risks. An additional channel of communication between the militaries of the two alliances in Europe could be used for a broad array of liaison functions. Even only partial success would justify the effort.


The process of initiating the proposed MLM exchange would consist of three basic steps on the NATO side: deliberation within the U.S. government, U.S. consultation with the NATO allies, and NATO negotiations with the Warsaw Pact. h the U.S. executive branch, the National Security Council is the logical organization to coordinate the MLM effort, and in particular to iron out possible disagreements between the Departments of Defense and State. These internal U.S. deliberations should include an investigation of the liaison functions carried out under the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. Washington should also ask Britain and France to share the results of similar studies of their parallel exchange agreements.

Responsibility for congressional study of the idea would fall naturally to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. In particular, the panels should examine whether the experience of the Nunn-Warner Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction provides any important substantive or procedural insights or lessons to officials planning the MLM exchange. In NATO a U.S. proposal to exchange missions with the Warsaw Pact should be considered first in the North Atlantic Council and second in the Military Committee. Once NATO's approval was secured, negotiations with the Warsaw Pact could begin.

None of the existing East-West channels of communication would be ideal for NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations on MLM exchanges. Conceivably, some acceptable modification of the MBFR format, the Helsinki Process with its two subsidiary security forums, or the bilateral U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations in Geneva might suffice.

But negotiations between the two military commanders who will supervise the missions would work even better.

An initial meeting could be arranged between SACEUR and the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact to explore the overall feasibility and practicality of the MLM plan. If this meeting is successful, each alliance could review and refine its proposal within six months. Then the two alliances could begin talks to resolve differences in approach, draw up specific provisions of the proposed agreement, select mutually acceptable sites for respective staff headquarters, and set a timetable for implementation.

The alliance-to-alliance liaison-exchange proposal takes the superpowers' forty-plus years of experience with bilateral MLMs in East and West Germany and applies it at a higher military level in Europe to cover the entire range of East-West military issues on the Continent. Thus, the plan would significantly expand East-West cooperation without requiring fundamental changes in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. At the same time, the MLMs should prove compatible with, and may provide a foundation for, basic transformations in superpower relations if and when the necessary international political conditions emerge.

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About the authors

John A. Fahey is associate professor emeritus of foreign languages and literature at Old Dominion University, having retired from active teaching in July 1988 after twenty-two years on the University faculty. Professor Fahey received a B.S. degree from the University of Maryland, an M.Ed. from the College of William and Mary, and a postgraduate diploma in intelligence from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He is a retired Navy Commander who directed the U.S. Navy Language School and served as an American Liaison Officer to the Soviet Army in Germany. He assisted the White House on several occasions, including performing certain liaison tasks during the visit of Nikita Khrushchev to the United States in September 1959.

Professor Fahey has led more than ten study tours to the USSR, studied in a Moscow State University program, and conducted a site visit to the new U.S. Embassy in Moscow for an American contractor. He has served as President of the Foreign Language Association of Virginia and President of the Virginia Chapter of the American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages. His articles have appeared in such publications as The Russian Review, The Russian Language, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Officer Review, and The Torch.

Philip S. Gillette is associate professor of political science and director of the graduate program in international studies at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia.  Dr. Gillette received a B.A., an M.A. in Regional Studies for the Soviet Union, and a
Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. Before coming to Old Dominion in 1978, he taught on the faculties of Columbia University, Rutgers Universities, and Kalamazoo College.

Dr. Gillette's previous affiliations have included the Harriman Institute at Columbia, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, and the Russian Research Center at Harvard. His articles on Soviet affairs and Soviet-American relations have appeared in
Atlantic Monthly, Current History, Soviet Studies, and Slavic Review. He is co-editor of Sources of Soviet Naval Conduct (forthcoming).

20 Initiatives for a New Agenda in U.S.-Soviet Relations

1. Joint Development of an Inherently Safe Nuclear Reactor, Jack N. Barkenbus
2. Converting Nuclear Missiles for Peaceful Use, William C. Potter and Ann M. Florini
3. A Bilateral Endowment for the Arts and Humanities, John Logan Burrow and Patricia O'Leary
4. A (Partially) Convertible Ruble, Steven Roseflelde
5. A $100 Billion Understanding, Barry Blechman with the assistance of Ethan Gut mann
6. Strategic Information Exchanges as Confidence-Building Measures, Paul Chrzanowski, William Dunlop, Peter Moulthrop, and George Staehle
7. An Advisory Council on American-Soviet Relations, Jack Perry
8. Cooperation in Surgical Oncology, J. Ralph Broadwater, M.D.; Michael J. Edwards, M.D.; Merrick I. Ross, M.D.; and Charles M. Balch, M.D.
9. Military Liaisons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, John A. Fahey and Philip S. Gillette
10. Demonstration Centers for Educational Reform, Stephen T. Kerr
11. A Soviet Special Economic Zone, Charles E. Ziegler
12. A Radio Telescope Larger than Earth, George A. Seielstad
13. An American College in Moscow, Karen A. Weisblatt
14. Cooperation to Protect the Environment and Conserve Resources, David McClave
15. Promoting Public Diplomacy through Direct Satellite Broadcasting, Thomas F. Rogers
16. A Soviet-American Peace Corps, Alan Robock
17. Rethinking Business with the U.S.S.R., Laurence W Britt
18. Combined Remote-Sensing Observations of the Earth from Space, Paul Adam Blanchard
19. A New Export Regime for Information Technologies, Judith A. Thornton
20. U.S.-Soviet Cooperation on Terrorism, John Marks

1. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," International Security, vol. 1, no. 4 (Spring 1986): 122.

2. For a survey of past U.S.-Soviet military-to-military contacts, see Wade J. Williams, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Military Dialogue," Barry M. Blechman, ed., Preventing Nuclear War: A Realistic Approach (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1985), 14466.

3. The text of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement was made available by Richard Fairbanks, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, through the assistance of Senator Paul E. Tsongas (D-MA): Fairbanks to Tsongas, November 24,1981, and Tsongas to Fahey, December 3, 1981.  [USMLM Association ed. copy of Huebner-Malinin Agreement is linked here from the USMLM official histories.]

4. NATO Information Service, NATO Handbook (Brussels, 1985), 35.

5. New York Times, May 17, 1960, 17.

6. New York Times. May 25. 1960. 1.

7. For example, see: Jonathan Dean, Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987), 213; David T. Twining, "An East-West Center for Military Cooperation," in John Borawski, ed., Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), 173-83; John Borawski, "Practical Steps for Building Confidence in Europe," Arms Control Today, voL 18, no.2 (March 1988): 17-18.

8. "CDE: First Arms Agreement of the '80s: An Interview with U.S. Chief Negotiator Robert L. Barry," Ams Control Today, vol. 16, no. 8 (November 1986): 18.

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